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On Inequality by Harry G. Frankfurt brings together slightly altered 
versions of two journal articles that question the intrinsic or fun-
damental value of equality (Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral 
Ideal”, Ethics 98(1), 1987, 21-43; and “Equality and Respect”, Social 
Research 64(1), 1997, 3-15. See also “The Moral Irrelevance of Equal-
ity”, Public Affairs Quarterly 14(2), 2000, 87-103).
The first question that prospective readers of this book will be 
asking themselves is how similar the material in the book is to the 
two journal articles on which it is based. In addition to the brief dis-
cussion of Barack Obama’s state of the union address from December 
2013 and Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty First Century, there 
are a large number of small changes. More significant passages that 
can be found in the original that are missing from the book’s version 
of “Equality as a Moral Ideal” include the discussion of Thomas Nagel 
and Ronald Dworkin (which can be found on pages 35-37 and 33-34 
of “Equality as a Moral Ideal” respectively) as examples of thinkers 
who make the sorts of mistakes Frankfurt urges us to avoid and the 
appendix, which discusses John Rawls. Readers may welcome the 
decision to include footnotes 11 and 12 of the original in the main 
text of the book, which helpfully explain points about diminishing 
marginal utility in a less technical manner than the original (26-27). 
I could identify only a few very small differences between the origi-
nal 1997 version of “Equality and Respect” and the book version. 
The effect of the alternations is to make the material marginally 
clearer and less cumbersome to read.
Many readers will be familiar with Frankfurt’s ground-breaking 
and highly influential work in many areas of philosophy including 
his 1987 paper “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, which inspired contem-
porary sufficientarianism, the view that securing enough of some 
good(s) is an especially important moral demand. Readers are likely 
to be less familiar with his 1997 “Equality and Respect”, which picks 
apart the notions of respect and equality. Taken together the two 
papers in this book argue for a rejection of intrinsic, fundamental or 
non-derivative value of equality and argue that our reasons to value 
equality can be traced back to sufficiency and respect. Throughout 
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the book Frankfurt urges us to consider the mistake we make when 
we constrain our reflections on what makes a life valuable by the 
cost of other’s ambitions or work out what we owe to other people 
based on comparisons with others and not the conspicuous features 
of their situation, such as their needs and interests. I will now pro-
vide a summary of each paper in turn following each with some criti-
cal remarks before concluding.
In the first part of the book, “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Frank-
furt makes two main points. The first is that economic equality has 
no intrinsic value and that an ideal of economic equality encourages 
us to determine our life plans by comparing it to the costliness of 
others’ plans. In Frankfurt’s own words:
the false belief that economic equality is important for its own sake 
leads people to separate the problem of estimating their proper mon-
etary ambitions from the problem of what is most fundamentally sig-
nificant to themselves (13).
How much money a person requires to live a content or reason-
able life, for that is what really matters, is highly unlikely to be the 
same as what others require. Only where the same or equal amounts 
of money are suficient are they actually morally desirable. Thus, 
equality is not intrinsically or fundamentally valuable.
This brings us to the second aim, which is to show that sufficien-
cy, not equality, ought to be our moral ideal and that “from the point 
of view of morality, it is not important that everyone should have the 
same. What is morally important is that each should have enough” 
(7). In the end Frankfurt endorses a sufficiency principle that holds 
that everyone should have enough and that a person has enough when 
she is content with the level of contentment in her life. This level of 
contentment is indicated by the absence of an active interest in secur-
ing more (53).
Before I make two critical points about the argument it is worth 
stating the important contribution of the paper that this part of the 
book is based on, which was to prompt many people to reconsider 
the value of equality and the place of considerations of sufficiency 
within distributive justice and ethics. Perhaps most striking is the 
idea that if everyone had secured enough it would be of no conse-
quence that some had more than others. It certainly prompts us to 
think carefully about whether we care about people being equally 
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well-off or well-off rather than badly-off, fundamentally. This and 
other ideas in this paper have led to the development and theorisation 
of sufficiency as a rival distributive ideal to equality. Such develop-
ment is inconceivable without the publication of this paper.
The first critical point I will make concerns the target of Frank-
furt’s attention: the intrinsic value of economic equality. Neither Pik-
etty nor Obama, who are discussed in the introduction and preface, 
make this claim. The attention that they pay to equality or inequality 
could better be cashed out in terms of an instrumental concern that 
inequality can be bad for other reasons. Nor are they claims that 
contemporary political or moral philosophers make, who, insofar as 
they endorse equality as fundamentally valuable prefer equality of 
welfare to equality of economic resources and typically do not hold 
equality to be the only thing that matters. (See, for example, Larry 
Temkin, “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection”, in 
The Ideal of Equality, ed. by Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams, 
Macmillan, 2000, 126-161.) Even if one did hold the view that it was 
in itself good for everyone to have equal money it is possible to hold 
that there are other, weightier, fundamental values, which could lead 
to an overall moral theory that was not vulnerable to Frankfurt’s 
critique. As such, and insofar as we take these claims to apply only to 
their intended target, the claims lack significance (and the re-issue 
seems to lack motivation). When reading this part of the book it is 
not hard to see that the arguments have wider application, but one 
cannot help but be a bit annoyed that a straw-man stands in for equal-
ity.
A second critical point relates to objections that Frankfurt’s argu-
ments are vulnerable to. In the last 27 years the doctrine of sufficien-
cy has generated several compelling objections. I will note three such 
objections. (Many of these objections, as well as a close study of the 
anatomy of sufficientarian positions, are contained in Paula Casal, 
“Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough”, Ethics 117(2), 2007, 296-326.)
The first objection, we might call the Indifference Objection and it 
holds that the doctrine of sufficiency is implausible because it im-
plies that we should be indifferent to inequalities among those with 
enough. (The term ‘indifference objection’ comes from my “The 
prospects for sufficientarianism”, Utilitas 24(1), 2012, 101-117. The 
objection is noted in Richard Arneson, “Distributive Ethics and Basic 
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Capability Equality: ‘Good Enough’ is Not Good Enough”, in Capabil-
ities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems, ed. by A. Kaufman, Routledge, 
2005, 17-43: 26-33; Yitzhak Benbaji, “The doctrine of sufficiency: A 
defence”, Utilitas 17(3), 2005, 310-332; Yitzhak Benbaji, “Sufficien-
cy or Priority?”, European Journal of Philosophy 14(3), 2006, 327-48; 
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Educational equality versus edu-
cational adequacy: A critique of Anderson and Satz”, Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 26(2), 2009, 117-128: 125-6; Casal, “Why Sufficiency is 
not Enough”, 298-300 and 310-314; Nils Holtug, “Prioritarianism”, 
in Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality, ed. by 
N. Holtug and K. Lippert-Rasmussen, Oxford, 2006, 125-155: 149-
154; Robert Huseby, “Sufficiency: restated and defended”, Journal 
of Political Philosophy 18(2), 2010, 178-197: 190; Larry S. Temkin, 
“Equality, priority or what?”, Economics and Philosophy 19(1), 2003, 
61-87: 65-66 and “Egalitarianism Defended”, Ethics 113(4), 2003, 
764-782: 765-6 and 769-776. For a similarly worrying implication 
of this view see Karl Widerquist, “How the Sufficiency Minimum 
Becomes a Social Maximum”, Utilitas 22(4), 2010, 474-480.) If there 
are only two groups of people, one is extremely contented and the 
other is adequately contented, it is plausible to think that any neces-
sary taxation should be progressive and that any additional benefits 
that become available should go to the least contented rather than the 
most contented. (For an interesting discussion of how sufficientar-
ians like Frankfurt may be able to explain why progressive taxation 
is justified see Philipp Kanschik, “Why Sufficientarianism is not In-
different to Taxation”, Kriterion 29(2), 2015, 81-102.) The doctrine 
as stated cannot account for this intuition. More troubling, however, 
seems to be the implication of the doctrine that we should be in-
different about wasting additional benefits or indeed levelling the 
extremely contented down to the level of the adequately contended. 
This is not a knock-down objection to the doctrine of sufficiency, but 
some explanation and defence is required.
Another concern regards the threshold of contentment. (Casal, 
“Why sufficiency is not enough”; Robert E. Goodin, “Egalitarian-
ism, fetishistic and otherwise”, Ethics 98(1), 1987, 44-49; Huseby, 
“Sufficiency: restated and defended.”) Frankfurt claims that a person 
has enough when she is content with the level of contentment in her 
life. But this is compatible with people being authentically satisfied 
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with low levels of satisfaction or high levels of satisfaction because 
they internalise pernicious norms about their own social status being 
lower or higher than others. Here an egalitarian background, against 
which conceptions of satisfaction are formed, seems appropriate. 
But even with an appropriate background against which people form 
their expectations, some people could form much more expensive 
tastes and ambitions than others. It is not clear that resulting inequal-
ities would be unproblematic if, for example, some get very large 
and expensive houses while some live in small ones simply because 
they have authentic preferences for them. (Gerald A. Cohen, “On the 
currency of egalitarian justice”, Ethics 99(4), 1989, 906-944; Ronald 
Dworkin, “What is equality? Part 1: Equality of welfare”, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 10(3), 1981, 185-246.) Perhaps our ambitions are some-
thing we should take responsibility for the costs of.
One final criticism is that the doctrine of sufficiency is radically 
incomplete, offering us no guidance where we cannot ensure that 
any or all people secure enough. This seems especially important 
since it is possible that we will lack the economic resources to en-
sure that people have enough to be content with their level of con-
tentment in the foreseeable future. One suggestion in the paper is 
that we maximize the number of people who have enough, which 
Frankfurt mentions when discussing the scarcity case, but that view 
is highly problematic. (For advocacy of headcount sufficientarianism 
see Dale Dorsey, “Toward a Theory of the Basic Minimum”, Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics 7(4), 2008, 423-45: 432-7; Ed Page, Climate 
Change, Justice and Future Generations, Edward Elgar, 2006, 85-95; Ed 
Page, “Justice between generations: Investigating a sufficientarian ap-
proach”, Journal of Global Ethics 3(1), 2007, 3-20: 11; Roemer, “Eclec-
tic Distributional Ethics”, 273-4 and 278-9; Frankfurt, “Equality as 
a Moral Ideal”, 31.) It may lead to benefitting those who are close to 
the threshold by tiny amounts at huge cost to those who are further 
from the threshold. Of course, incompleteness is not an objection, 
but it is a limitation that would need to be addressed before we could 
endorse the doctrine.
In light of these criticisms an increasingly large body of literature 
has taken on the task of defending sufficiency as a distinctive and 
indispensable distributive ideal. Generally speaking advocates have 
modified the doctrine of sufficiency to avoid or respond better to the 
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objections in one of three ways.
Some have denied what Casal calls the negative thesis: that once 
people have enough we have no reasons to be concerned about distri-
butions. (Benbaji, “Sufficiency or Priority?”; Campbell Brown, “Pri-
ority or Sufficiency... or Both?”, Economics and Philosophy 21(2), 2005, 
199-220; Shields, “The Prospects for Sufficientarianism”; Andrew 
Williams, “Liberty, Equality, and Property”, The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Theory, ed. by J.Dryzek, B. Honig and A. Philips, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, 488-506: 501-3.) These sufficientarians 
have stressed that securing enough is the first priority but thereafter 
we should be concerned with inequalities or the least advantaged. 
Others have utilised multiple thresholds. (Benbaji, “The doctrine of 
sufficiency”; Casal, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough”; Huseby, “Suf-
ficiency: restated and defended”; Roemer, “Eclectic Distributional 
Ethics”.) These sufficientarians claim to have a high threshold above 
which indifference is genuinely not troubling and a lower threshold 
that captures the special urgency of meeting basic needs or securing 
survival. Finally, some have adopted a pluralist currency and argue 
that this can explain why we should not be concerned with inequali-
ties because intuitively troubling inequalities are always insuffi-
ciencies in some dimension. (David V. Axelsen and Lasse Nielsen, 
“Sufficiency as freedom from duress”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 
24(4), 2015, 406-426; Huseby “Sufficiency: restated and defended”. 
Capabilities theorists also seem to employ this feature. See Martha 
C Nussbaum, Women and human development: The capabilities approach, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000.) These views are themselves not 
without their critics, but given the amount of well-establish litera-
ture devoted to criticising and defending the views it is a shame that 
an updated version of the paper was not updated in light of them.
In the second part of the book, “Equality and Respect” Frank-
furt’s target is different. Rather than criticizing economic equality 
he focusses on equality of all kinds, including equality of welfare, 
resources and opportunity. In particular, he contrasts the general 
idea of equality, treating people the same, with the idea of respect, 
treating people in accordance with their morally relevant features, 
and argues again to the conclusion that equality has no inherent value 
because equality is only valuable where it coincides with the demands 
of respect, which is what really matters.
Book Reviews144
The paper takes as its jumping-off point Nagel’s comment that 
“How could it not be an evil that some people’s life prospects at birth 
are radically inferior to others’?” (quoted in Frankfurt: 69). Two 
main points are made. The first dovetails nicely the sufficientarian 
arguments of the first part: 
The egalitarian condemnation of inequality as inherently bad loses 
much of its force, I believe, when we recognize that those who are 
doing considerably worse than others may nonetheless be doing rather 
well. (71). 
This relative lack of concern we feel once we know that the least 
well off in an unequal society are, in absolute terms, well off is one of 
the important intuitive drivers in the work. Roger Crisp makes good 
use of this intuition in his defence of sufficientarianism. (R. Crisp, 
“Equality, Priority, and Compassion”, Ethics, 113(4), 2003, 745-63.)
Frankfurt explains the difference between respect and equality in 
the following passage, 
The most fundamental difference between equality and respect has to 
do with focus and intent. With regard to any interesting parameter — 
whether it pertains to resources, welfare, opportunity, right, considera-
tion, concern, or whatever — equality is merely a matter of each person’s 
having the same as others. Respect is more personal. Treating a person 
with respect means, in the sense that is germane here, dealing with him 
exclusively on the basis of those aspects of his particular character or cir-
cumstances that are actually relevant to the issue at hand. (77-78)
In arguing for respect and against equality as a presumptive or 
default value, Frankfurt states that 
It may be that the entitlements of all people to certain things are in 
fact the same. If this were to be so, however, it would not be because 
equality is important. Rather, it would be because all people happen to 
be the same, or are necessarily the same, with regard to the character-
istics from which the entitlements in question derive — for instance, 
common humanity, a capacity for suffering, citizenship in the kingdom 
of ends, or whatever. (75-76)
However, the idea of treating people in accordance with mor-
ally relevant characteristics and not in accordance with morally ir-
relevant characteristics, as an alternative to equality, is simply to go 
back one step to a more formal notion than equality. It remains to 
be shown that this view is best fleshed out in ways that are differ-
ent from equality. No doubt many political philosophers, including 
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Luck Egalitarians and Rawlsians, see their distributive principles as 
entirely consistent with this idea. Moreover, in justifying principles 
of justice itself through contractual procedures many believe that 
we do well to ignore their differences and personal characteristics, 
such as sex, race, religion, social class and particular plans or ambi-
tions and only take our shared human capacities for moral and ra-
tional agency as a basis for the distribution of benefits and burdens. 
(See for example R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University 
Press, 2001; J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a restatement, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.) As such, it is not clear to what 
extent these insights have not already been incorporated or rejected 
in contemporary egalitarian theories, especially so-called relational 
egalitarianism. (E. Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?”, Ethics 
109(2), 1999, 287-337; Christian Schemmel, “Distributive and rela-
tional equality”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11(2), 2012, 123-148; 
Samuel Scheffler, “What is Egalitrianism?”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 
31(1), 2003, 5-39.)
In summary, the papers in this book are extremely similar to 
those readers will likely be familiar with and, for an academic phi-
losopher, there’s nothing new of importance in this presentation. 
However, the papers are interesting and important and should be 
widely read.
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